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Overview	  
•  The	  changing	  face	  of	  infowar	  
•  The	  Advanced	  Persistent	  
Threat	  
•  Examples	  of	  recent	  cyber	  
a@acks	  
•  MiBgaBon	  and	  preparaBon	  
•  Formalizing	  the	  response	  
•  The	  role(s)	  of	  educaBon	  
2 
The	  Scope	  of	  the	  Problem	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The	  New	  Face	  of	  Infowar	  
•  Today's	  informaBon	  warfare	  is	  
–  No	  longer	  about	  pedestrian	  
hackers	  and	  Web	  defacement	  
–  Being	  performed	  by	  
professionals	  for	  monetary,	  
poliBcal,	  or	  ideological	  gain	  
–  Not	  aimed	  at	  "crashing	  the	  
Internet"	  
–  Designed	  to	  use	  informaBon	  in	  
an	  opBmal	  way	  at	  the	  
convenience	  of	  the	  a@acker	  
–  Persistent,	  targeted,	  adaptable	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A	  Snapshot	  of	  Cyber	  Threats...	  
•  Network	  Intrusion	  Of	  Western	  Retailer	  By	  'WarcraT,'	  ResulBng	  In	  Unauthorized	  Use	  Of	  
Customer	  Credit	  Cards	  
•  IdenBﬁcaBon	  Of	  Internet	  Protocol	  Addresses	  In	  A	  Secure	  Shell	  Brute	  Force	  A@ack	  On	  A	  
Nevada-­‐Based	  Personal	  Internet	  Server	  
•  A@empted	  Recruitment	  of	  Money	  Mules	  Using	  Web	  Sites	  Registered	  in	  China	  and	  Hosted	  in	  
Russia	  or	  Ukraine	  
•  Compromise	  of	  IdenBﬁed	  U.S.	  Bank	  Account	  Via	  Keylogger,	  ResulBng	  In	  Fraudulent	  
Automated	  Clearing	  House	  Transfers	  Laundering	  Funds	  to	  Ukraine	  	  
•  Email	  SolicitaBon	  of	  At-­‐Home	  Workers	  Linked	  to	  Russian	  Wire	  Transfer	  Service	  
•  IntegraBon	  of	  Denial	  of	  Service	  A@acks	  and	  Computer	  Intrusions	  to	  Facilitate	  Unauthorized	  
Wire	  Transfers	  from	  the	  Account	  of	  the	  Customer	  of	  an	  Internet-­‐Based	  Business	  in	  October	  
2009	  
•  Malware	  Worm	  InfecBon	  of	  Ten	  Host	  School	  Computers	  
•  TheT	  of	  Trade	  Secrets	  2009:	  PotenBal	  TargeBng	  by	  Chinese	  Actors	  
•  Money	  Mule	  Recruitment	  Using	  Website	  Miraclad.com	  Hosted	  in	  Russia,	  Registered	  in	  India,	  
and	  ExﬁltraBon	  of	  Funds	  to	  Persons	  in	  Poland	  
•  IdenBﬁcaBon	  of	  User	  Names	  ExploiBng	  Vulnerability	  in	  MicrosoT	  Frontpage	  to	  Obtain	  
Personal	  InformaBon	  
Source: FBI, March 2010 
...And	  Who's	  Online	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4 
The	  Advanced	  Persistent	  Threat	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  ©	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Advanced	  Persistent	  Threat	  
•  An	  enBrely	  diﬀerent	  class	  of	  infowar	  
a@ack	  
•  These	  a@acks	  may	  be	  targeted...	  
–  They	  can	  be	  deﬂected	  for	  a	  Bme,	  but	  the	  
a@ackers	  do	  not	  go	  away	  
–  Combine	  social	  engineering,	  technical	  
vulnerabiliBes,	  phishing,	  spearphishing,	  and	  
other	  tools	  in	  the	  hacker	  toolkit	  
•  ...or	  exploit	  popular	  soTware	  of	  no	  
parBcular	  value	  to	  the	  a@ackers	  
–  Except	  to	  spread	  the	  fog	  of	  war	  
5 
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APT	  Life	  Cycle	  
•  Standard	  intel	  gathering/exploitaBon	  cycle:	  
1.  Reconnaissance	  
2.  IniBal	  intrusion	  into	  the	  network	  
3.  Establish	  a	  backdoor	  into	  the	  network	  
4.  Obtain	  user	  credenBals	  
5.  Install	  various	  uBliBes	  
6.  Privilege	  escalaBon,	  lateral	  movement,	  data	  
exﬁltraBon	  
7.  Maintain	  persistence	  
Source:	  MANDIANT	  
The	  Role	  of	  the	  PRC	  
•  The	  APT	  is	  not	  a	  group	  of	  rogue	  
hackers;	  it	  is	  state-­‐sponsored	  
informaBon	  warfare	  
–  The	  Aurora	  a@ack	  did	  not	  target	  
Google's	  Beijing	  employees;	  it	  
targeted	  the	  U.S.	  employees	  because	  
they	  had	  access	  to	  the	  source	  code	  
•  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  China	  is	  
developing	  an	  Integrated	  Network	  
Electronic	  Warfare	  capability	  
comprising	  computer	  network	  
exploitaBon	  and	  a@acks,	  and	  
electronic	  warfare	  
–  Underground	  hacker	  listserves	  are	  a	  
recruiBng	  ground	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	   9	  
6 
Film	  at	  Eleven...	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	   10	  
Source: TheEpochTimes 
EXPOSED: A picture of the 
hacking software shown during 
the Chinese military program. 
The large writing at the top says 
"Select Attack Target." Next, the 
user choose an IP address to 
attack from (it belongs to an 
American university). The drop-
down box is a list of Falun Gong 
websites, while the button on the 
left says "Attack." (China Central 
Television)  
The IP address resolves to 
dali.chem.uab.edu. (GCK) 
But	  is	  Everything	  an	  APT?	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•  Mid-­‐December	  2009	  cyber	  a@ack	  
–  Disclosed	  by	  Google	  in	  January	  2010,	  although	  there	  are	  
reportedly	  dozens	  of	  other	  targets	  (including	  Adobe	  
Systems	  and	  Juniper	  Networks)	  
–  Originated	  in	  China	  
•  Google	  stated	  that	  its	  IP	  had	  been	  stolen	  and	  the	  accounts	  of	  
Chinese	  dissidents	  targeted	  
–  MacAfee	  reported	  a@ack	  exploited	  zero-­‐day	  vulnerability	  
in	  Internet	  Explorer	  
•  Although	  not	  publically	  disclosed,	  the	  vulnerability	  had	  been	  
known	  by	  MicrosoT	  since	  September	  2009	  
–  VeriSign	  reports	  that	  a@acks	  launched	  by	  "agents	  of	  the	  
Chinese	  state	  or	  proxies	  thereof"	  	  
Stuxnet	  
•  Discovered	  June	  2010	  
–  A	  computer	  worm	  exploiBng	  a	  ﬂaw	  in	  Windows	  but	  
targeBng	  Siemens	  supervisory	  control	  and	  data	  acquisiBon	  
(SCADA)	  systems	  
–  A	  programmable	  logic	  controller	  (PLC)	  rootkit	  
–  Primary	  target	  was	  speciﬁc	  centrifuge	  models	  at	  Iranian	  
nuclear	  research	  faciliBes	  
–  59%	  of	  vicBms	  were	  in	  Iran,	  18%	  in	  Indonesia	  
–  Highly-­‐speciﬁc	  a@ack,	  probably	  state-­‐sponsored	  
–  First	  variant	  appeared	  in	  June	  2009	  
–  Second	  variant	  appeared	  in	  early	  2010	  
–  SpeculaBon	  that	  the	  discovery	  was	  inadvertant	  and	  that	  Stuxnet	  
was	  supposed	  to	  remain	  covert	  unBl	  needed	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•  Reported	  February	  2011	  
–  WikiLeaks	  posts	  Collateral	  Murder	  video,	  260K	  U.S.	  
diplomaBc	  cables,	  Afghan	  War	  Diary	  (92K	  documents),	  and	  
Iran	  War	  Logs	  (400K	  documents)	  (Jan.-­‐Oct.,	  2010)	  
–  Many	  sites	  halt	  all	  dealings	  with	  WikiLeaks	  
–  Anonymous	  hacker	  group	  launches	  DoS	  a@acks	  on	  anB-­‐
WikiLeaks	  oﬀenders	  
–  HBGary	  Federal	  announces	  that	  they	  know	  the	  idenBty	  of	  
Anonymous	  members	  
–  Anonymous	  launches	  social	  engineering	  a@ack,	  coupled	  
with	  SQL	  injecBon,	  on	  HBGary	  Federal,	  eventually	  
acquiring	  ~70K	  corporate	  and	  customer	  e-­‐mail	  messages	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	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•  Reported	  March	  2011	  
– Phishing	  e-­‐mails	  sent	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
low-­‐level	  employees	  
– A@achment	  contained	  a	  zero-­‐day	  exploit	  in	  Adobe	  
Flash,	  allowing	  installaBon	  of	  Poison	  Ivy	  RAT	  
– Accessed	  corporate	  network,	  escalated	  privileges,	  
acquired	  informaBon,	  and	  compromised	  RSA	  
SecureID	  tokens	  
•  ~50M	  hardware	  tokens	  and	  ~250M	  smartphone	  apps	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	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9 
•  Sony	  PlayStaBon	  Network	  (PSN)	  hack	  (April	  2011)	  
–  PSN	  and	  Qriocity	  network	  down	  
–  Over	  a	  two-­‐week	  period,	  Sony	  incrementally	  reports	  
network	  failures,	  that	  the	  network	  was	  hacked,	  it	  is	  
being	  rebuilt,	  personal	  informaBon	  might	  have	  been	  
compromised,	  and	  credit	  card	  informaBon	  was	  lost	  
–  19	  year	  old	  arrested	  in	  U.K.	  (June	  2011)	  
•  Sony	  Pictures	  databases	  a@acked	  (June	  2011)	  
–  Two	  LulzSec	  members	  arrested	  (Sept.	  2011)	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  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	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OperaBon	  Shady	  RAT	  
•  Reported	  August	  2011	  
– "Five	  year	  targeted	  operaBon	  by	  one	  speciﬁc	  
actor"	  reported	  by	  McAfee	  
•  More	  than	  70	  organizaBons	  in	  14	  countries	  were	  
targeted,	  including	  U.N.,	  IOC,	  defense	  contractors,	  and	  
businesses	  
•  The	  "actor"	  is	  reported	  to	  be	  China	  
–  Is	  this	  an	  APT?	  
•  Some	  said	  that	  McAfee	  is	  being	  "alarmist"	  because	  
Shady	  RAT	  is	  neither	  new	  nor	  sophisBcated	  
•  McAfee	  observes	  that	  it	  was	  eﬀecBve!	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Anonymous	  
•  Staging	  Internet	  hackBvism	  since	  2003	  
•  Came	  into	  recent	  popular	  awareness	  due	  to	  
mainstream	  negaBve	  responses	  to	  WikiLeaks	  and	  
Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  
•  A@acks,	  threats,	  and	  Web	  defacement	  targets	  	  in	  
2012	  include	  CIA,	  FBI,	  police	  departments*,	  
Greek	  and	  U.S.	  DOJ,	  the	  VaBcan,	  Interpol,	  and	  
InfraGard...	  
–  ...and	  neo-­‐Nazi	  and	  Syrian	  government	  sites	  
•  The	  amorphous,	  constant	  nature	  of	  Anonymous...	  
is	  this	  an	  APT?	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	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   18	  *	  including	  Burlington	  (VT)	  P.D.	  
MiBgaBon	  and	  PreparaBon	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Gerng	  Back	  to	  Basics	  
•  New	  technological	  soluBons	  will	  be	  needed	  but	  we	  are	  
already	  underuBlizing	  current	  technologies	  
–  Ingress	  ﬁltering	  by	  ISPs	  
–  Least	  privilege	  
–  SeparaBon	  of	  duBes	  
–  MAC,	  DAC,	  RBAC	  
–  Network-­‐based	  and	  host-­‐based	  protecBon	  
–  MulB-­‐factor	  authenBcaBon	  
–  Virtual	  VPNs?	  
•  Best	  defense	  will	  conBnue	  to	  be	  defense-­‐in-­‐depth,	  
biodiversity,	  and	  redundancy...	  and	  educaBon	  
•  PrioriBze	  issues	  for	  a	  remediaBon	  strategy	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	   20	  
Basic	  Defense	  101	  
•  What	  are	  your	  informaBon	  resources?	  
•  Where	  is	  the	  greatest	  threat	  likelihood?	  
–  I.e.,	  what	  are	  the	  best	  targets	  and	  who	  
are	  the	  potenBal	  a@ackers?	  
•  Think	  like	  an	  adversary	  
–  If	  you	  were	  a@acking	  your	  own	  network,	  
with	  all	  you	  knew	  about	  your	  network,	  
what	  would	  you	  do?	  
–  Get	  outside	  of	  your	  cultural,	  moral,	  
ethical,	  social,	  and	  legal	  box	  
•  "There	  are	  no	  secure	  sites	  on	  the	  
Internet,	  only	  vigilant	  ones."	  (S.O.	  Bradner)	  
©	  2011-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	   21	  
12 
The	  Landscape	  is	  Changing	  
•  TradiBonal	  networks	  are	  morphing	  
into	  
–  Thin	  clients	  
–  Mobile	  compuBng	  
–  Cloud	  compuBng	  
–  Web-­‐based	  storage	  
•  InformaBon	  leakage	  will	  conBnue	  
to	  grow,	  largely	  driven	  by	  Web	  2.0	  
•  Data	  will	  conBnue	  to	  become	  
more	  portable	  
•  Networks	  will	  conBnue	  to	  be	  
increasingly	  porous	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The	  Role	  of	  the	  Users	  
•  Technology	  cannot	  defend	  against	  new	  
social	  engineering	  a@acks	  -­‐-­‐	  both	  online	  
and	  oﬄine	  -­‐-­‐	  that	  target	  humans	  
•  Problems	  can	  be	  miBgated	  with	  educaBon	  
–  Less	  so	  by	  training	  
–  We	  need	  to	  make	  users	  part	  of	  the	  soluBon!	  
•  On	  where	  should	  burden	  lie	  for	  protecBon	  
-­‐-­‐	  networks	  or	  users?	  
–  E.g.,	  highways.	  People	  know	  how	  to	  drive	  but	  
they	  are	  neither	  mechanics	  nor	  road	  
designers	  
–  E.g.,	  boaBng.	  There	  are	  no	  lanes,	  just	  rules	  of	  
the	  road!	  
13 
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The	  IA	  Culture	  Needs	  to	  Change	  
•  InformaBon	  security	  has	  been	  a	  problem	  since	  
the	  incepBon	  of	  informaBon!	  
•  The	  face	  of	  the	  infosec	  adversary	  is	  changing	  
– Our	  approach	  to	  securing	  informaBon	  has	  to	  be	  
ﬂuid	  and	  dynamic	  
– Defenders	  will	  always	  lag	  behind	  the	  a@ackers	  	  
•  InformaBon	  is	  an	  organizaBonal	  asset;	  thus...	  
– Recognize	  informaBon	  security	  as	  a	  business	  need	  
– Do	  not	  outsource	  infosec	  if	  at	  all	  possible	  
•  Protect	  data;	  not	  networks,	  not	  computers	  
Where	  To	  From	  Here?	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•  The	  "APT"	  term	  is	  probably	  being	  overused	  
•  That	  said,	  the	  threat	  is	  real	  and	  our	  adversaries	  are	  
escalaBng	  the	  types	  of	  a@acks,	  the	  tools,	  and	  their	  
persistence	  
•  If	  someone	  can	  a@ack	  Sony,	  HBGary,	  RSA,	  et	  al.	  at	  will,	  
can	  they	  successfully	  a@ack	  you??	  
•  Our	  response	  must	  be	  two-­‐pronged	  
–  ImplementaBon	  and	  policy	  (technology)	  
–  Strategy	  and	  tacBcs	  (analysis	  and	  intel)	  
14 
Formalizing	  the	  Response	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The	  Nature	  of	  Networks	  
•  The	  only	  secure	  computer	  is	  
one	  that	  is	  not	  connected	  to	  
another	  computer	  
•  The	  Internet	  has	  resulted	  in	  
the	  intertwingling	  of	  nearly	  
every	  computer	  -­‐-­‐	  including	  
smartphones	  -­‐-­‐	  onto	  one	  
global	  network	  
•  All	  informaBon	  security	  is	  local	  
but	  the	  a@ack	  vectors	  have	  
naBonal	  defense	  implicaBons	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15 
Basic	  Tenets	  of	  Infosec	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CIA	  
Triad	  










Telephone Service Disrupted 
Power 
Outage 
911 Unavailable Federal Agencies’ 
Phones Disrupted 
and Out of 
Service 
Two Regional ISPs 
Out of Service 
Synthesize	  This...	  
If these events occurred singly over a period of 
weeks, would we be able to recognize them as a 
dress rehearsal rather than one of the myriad 
problems that occur every day? 
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16 
The	  Federal	  Response	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•  InfraGard*	  formed	  
by	  FBI,	  1997	  
•  NIPC	  formed	  under	  
the	  FBI,	  1998	  


















































































































































































































Na/onal	  Infrastructure	  Protec/on	  Plan	   *	  >85%	  owned	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  
17 
The	  Role	  Of	  EducaBon	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ERAU	  Homeland	  Security	  Program	  
Mission	  Statement	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It is the purpose of the Homeland Security Program at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University to enhance and 
expand the discipline of homeland security by 
developing and delivering the highest quality academic 
and professional program in the field.  Academic 
courses, projects and field experiences are designed to 
provide exposure to concepts, procedures, and 
operations consistent with those found within 
agencies and organizations charged with providing 
homeland security for this nation.  
18 
DHS	  Cybersecurity	  Mission	  
The growing number of attacks on our cyber networks 
has become, in President Obama's words, "one of the 
most serious economic and national security threats our 
nation faces." The Department of Homeland Security 
plays an important role ... to keep our federal civilian 
networks secure, and secure the cyberspace and critical 
infrastructure on which we all depend. That means 
working across the federal government, partnering with 
the private sector, and empowering the general public to 
create a safe, secure, and resilient cyber environment, 
and promote cybersecurity knowledge and innovation. 
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What's	  In	  A	  Name?	  







PerspecBves	  on	  InformaBon	  Security	  
•  Several	  diﬀerent	  ways	  in	  which	  
to	  approach	  the	  pracBce	  of	  
infosec	  
–  ProacBve	  (infosec)	  vs.	  reacBve	  
(incident	  response,	  digital	  
forensics)	  
–  Oﬀensive	  (info	  ops)	  vs.	  defensive	  
(defense-­‐in-­‐depth)	  
–  Public	  policy	  vs.	  organizaBonal	  
implementaBon	  
–  Public	  sector	  vs.	  private	  sector	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Approaches	  to	  EducaBon	  
•  Undergraduate	  level	  
–  B.S.,	  InformaBon	  Security	  
•  Focus	  is	  on	  technology	  and	  
implementaBon	  
•  Subject	  ma@er	  includes	  
system	  administraBon,	  
soTware	  engineering,	  network	  
technology	  and	  protocols,	  
infosec	  technology	  
–  B.S.,	  Homeland	  Security	  w/	  
cybersecurity	  concentraBon	  
•  Focus	  is	  on	  threat	  analysis	  and	  
protecBon	  
•  Subject	  ma@er	  includes	  
Infosec	  technology	  and	  policy,	  
public	  policy	  and	  the	  law,	  
criBcal	  infrastructure	  planning,	  
anB-­‐terrorism	  and	  intelligence	  
gathering,	  business	  conBnuity	  
•  Graduate	  level	  
–  M.S.,	  InformaBon	  Security	  
•  Focus	  is	  on	  computer	  science	  
and	  engineering	  
•  Subject	  ma@er	  includes	  next	  
generaBon	  tools,	  algorithms,	  
methodologies	  
–  M.S.,	  InformaBon	  Security	  
Management	  
•  Focus	  is	  on	  managing	  the	  
process	  and	  organizaBon	  
•  Subject	  ma@er	  includes	  
analysis,	  policies,	  procedures,	  
interacBon	  with	  an	  
organizaBon,	  strategy	  and	  
tacBcs,	  personnel,	  business	  
pracBces,	  technology,	  
leadership	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20 
Centers	  of	  Academic	  Excellence	  
•  CAE	  in	  InformaBon	  Assurance	  EducaBon	  
–  NSA,	  DHS	  
•  Centers	  of	  Digital	  Forensics	  Academic	  
Excellence	  
–  DoD,	  DHS	  
•  Intelligence	  Community	  CAEs	  
–  Oﬃce	  of	  the	  Director	  of	  NaBonal	  Intelligence	  
•  Homeland	  Security	  Centers	  of	  Excellence	  
–  DHS	  
–  Note:	  Projects	  and	  research,	  not	  educaBon	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It's	  Like	  Herding	  Fish...	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Anyone who thinks that technology can 
solve all of their problems does not 
understand technology or their 
problems. 
A paraphrase by GCK 
Further	  Reading	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Acronyms	  and	  AbbreviaBons	  
APT 	  Advanced	  persistent	  threat	  
CAE 	  Center	  of	  Academic	  Excellence	  
CIA 	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  or	  
	  ConﬁdenSality,	  integrity,	  availability	  
DAC 	  DiscreSonary	  access	  control	  
DHS 	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  
DoD 	  Department	  of	  Defense	  
DOJ 	  Department	  of	  JusSce	  
FBI 	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  InvesSgaSon	  
IA 	  InformaSon	  assurance	  
IOC 	  InternaSonal	  Olympic	  Commi^ee	  
IP 	  Internet	  Protocol	  
ISP 	  Internet	  service	  provider	  
K 	  Thousand	  (103)	  or	  kilo	  (210)	  
M 	  Million	  (106)	  or	  mega	  (220)	  
MAC 	  Mandatory	  access	  control	  
NIAC 	  NaSonal	  Infrastructure	  Advisory	  Council	  
NIPC 	  NaSonal	  Infrastructure	  ProtecSon	  Center	  
NSA 	  NaSonal	  Security	  Agency	  
PRC 	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  
RAT 	  Remote	  access	  trojan	  
RBAC 	  Role-­‐based	  access	  control	  
SQL 	  Structured	  Query	  Language	  
UN 	  United	  NaSons	  
VPN 	  Virtual	  private	  network	  
